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It is contended that in equity the vessel should contribute
for the loss, as the deck load was used in putting her in trim
for sea. That is begging the question. I cannot enter into
consideration of the inducement to the contract of the parties.
The libel will be dismissed.
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AGENT.
Ri jhts of Principles- Trhen knowledge of the Agent is not notice
to the Principal.-The appellant was employed by the agent of the
appellee, to do certain work in fitting up offices for the latter, in
the city of Baltimore; the work was done as required, and the
offices were accepted by the appellee, and used in the prosecution
of its business. When the work was nearly done, the agent of
appellant applied to the agent of the appellee for some money on
account; the latter thereupon gave his post dated check for $700
on Thomas & Co., bankers, in the city of Baltimore, payable to the
order of the appellant, but stated, at the same time, that there was
not then money enough with the bankers to pay it, but that he
would be supplied with funds in time to pay it, by the treasurer of
the appellee, who was then absent from town, but would return in
a few days. On the faith of this statement, a receipt for the $700
was given by the agent of the appellant. On the day of the date
of the check, and several times afterward, the check was presented
to Thomas & Co., and payment demanded; but the same was refused
on the ground that there was not money enough to the credit of the
drawer. Subsequently the appellant's agent called several times at
the office of the treasurer of the appellee, and was told each time
that be was out of town. Shortly after the check was given the
agent of the appellee drew a draft upon his principal, in favor of
Thomas & Co., but being at the time largely indebted to his princi-
pal, payment was refused until he brought in a number of vouchers.
including the receipt for $700, when the draft was paid; it would
I From J. S. Stockett, Esq., Reporter, to appear in 30 Md. Rep.
2 From Cias. E. Green, Esq., to appear in Vol. 5 o his Rep.
3 From leon. 0. L. Barbour, to appear In Vol. 55 of his Rep.
4 From J. E. Hale, Esq., Reporter, to appear in 37 Cal. Reports,
. From T. A. Post, Esq., Reporter, to appear in 45 Mo., Rep.
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uot have been paid, if a satisfactory amount of vouchers had not
been brought in. The account of the agent of the appellee was
finally closed on the books of the latter, by dredits for vouchers
brought in: Held, 1. That the appellant is not entitled to recover
from the appellee the amount of the check. . 2. That the knowledge
of the agent of the appellee was not notice, either actual or con-
structive to his principal: Brown v. Bankers' and Brokers' Tele-
graph Co., 30. Md.
If a creditor of the principal settles with the agent, and takes a
note or other security from the latter for the amount due by the
principal, although as between the parties, it is intended only as a
conditional payment, yet if the creditor gives a receipt as if the
money were received, or the security were an absolute payment, so
that the agent is thereby enabled to settle with the principal as if
the debt-had been -actually discharged, and the principal would
otherwise be prejudiced, the debt will be deemed, as to the latter,
absolutely discharged: Id.
BANK.
Bank Depositor-Forged Check-(Clearing House-Negligence.-
On the 20th of December, 1868, H presented himself at the Com-
mercial and Farmers' National Bank, to whose officers he was
unknown, and stated that he desired to open an account, and pre-
sented a check on the First National Bank for $4,600,15, purpor-
ing-to have been drawn by A, dated the 18th of December, and
payable to the order of H, who endorsed it, and the amount of the
check was entered to his credit, as cash, and a bank-book furnished
by the bank; but on the same day the teller was directed by the
cashier not to allow the account to be drawn upon until the depos-
ited check was known to be good or was paid. On the following
morning this check was sent to the Clearing House, and thence was
taken to the First National Bank, where it was passed as genuine
by the proper officers of the bank, charged to the account of A, and
credited to the Commercial and Farmers' National Bank. By the
custom and usage of all the banks in the City of Baltimore, where
a check is sent through the Clearing House to the bank on which
it is drawn, and is not heard from before eleven o'clock of the day
on which it is so sent, the bank sending it has the right to assume
it was good, or had been Paid, and to act accordingly. On the 22d
December, H called at the bank where he had made the deposit,
with his bank-book, filled up a check for $4,500, payable to his own
order, and handed it for payment to the paying teller, who, after
satisfying himself by inquiry of the receiving teller as to his iden-
tity, and by the examination of the books of the bank as to the
state of his account, paid him the amount of his check. On the
24th December, the account of A was overdrawn to the amount of
$372 on the books of the First National Bank, and the overdrawing
continued until the 29th, when his account was overdrawn $2,297 ;
after bank hours of that day A was, for the first time, informed by
the bank officers of such overdrawing, wbven, upon an examination
of his account and checks, he pronounced the ch.ck deposited by
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tion H a forgery. Notice of the forgery was given by the First Na-
tional Bank to the Commercial and Farmers' National bank, on the
31st of December, and repayment of the money demanded; but
the latter denied its liability beyond the $100.15 still remainingto
the credit of H. The First National Bank having refunded to A
the amount of the forged check, sued the Commercial and Farmers'
National Bank to recover the amount thus paid. Held, 1. That
the law imposed upon the First National Bank the obligation of
knowing the signature of A, one of its depositors, and it is, there-
fore, not entitled to recover from the Commercial and Farmers'
National Batik the sum of $4,500 paid by the latter to H, for as
between parties equally innocent and equally deceived, but where
one is bound to know and to act upon its knowledge, and the other
has no means of knowledge, the loss should be thrown upon the
former rather than upon the latter: Commercial and Farmers'
Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 30 Md.
2. That the sending of the check deposited by H through the
Clearing House by the Commercial and Farmers' National Bank,
and the failure to communicate to the First National Bank the
fact that it was received from a stranger, was not such negligence
as should throw the loss upon the former bank: Id.
3. That the First National Bank is entitled to a judgment for
$100.15, the balance remaining in the Commercial and Farmers'
National Bank to the credit of H: Id.
BANKRUPTCY.
rurisdiction-State Insolvent Laws.-Under the Act of Congress
entitled "An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy
throughout the United States," approved March 2, 1867, the Fede-
ral courts have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters and proceed-
ings in bankruptcy: Vran Nostrand v. Carr, 30 Md.
The application of a party for the benefit of the Insolvent Laws
of Maryland is an act of bankruptcy within the provisions of the
39th section of the Bankrupt Law of the United States: Id.
The insufficiency of the assets of an insolvent debtor to pay fifty
per cent. of his debts, and the uncertainty of his being able to pro-
cure the written consent of a majority in number and value of his
creditors, who have proved their claims, to his discharge in no
way affect the jurisdiction of the Bankrupt Court; its jurisdiction
is independent of the right of the party ultimately to obtain his
discharge: Id.
State Insolvent Laws-Procee lings pending in State Courts
when Bankrupt Law passe?.-The statute of this State for the
relief of insolvent debtors and protection of creditors (Stats. 1852,
p. 69), is in conflict with the Federal Bankrupt Law, passed March
2d. 1867, and has been suspended in its operations from the time
said bankrupt law went into fect: Ifartin v. Berry, 37 Cal.
The Federal Bankrupt Law, passed March 2d, 1867, did not go
into efceot so as to suspend the operations of the insolvent law of
this Rtate until June 1st, 1867: Id.
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Where a State court has acquired jurisdiction under a State law
of a case of insolvency, and is engaged in settling the debts and
distributing the assets of the insolvent before or at the date at
which an Act of Congress upon the same subject takes effect, the
State court may nevertheless proceed with the case to its final con-
clusion, and its action in the matter'will be as valid as if no law
upon the subject had been passed by Congress: Id.
CERTIORARI.
Will not Lie, Except to Be view Judicial Proceedings.- he ac-
tion of a gounty court in subscribing to railroad stock and issuing
bonds for payment thereof, is discretionary and not a judicial pro-
ceeding, and therefore not the subject of review by writ of certi-
orari from the Supreme Court: JMatter of Saline County Sub-
scription, 45 Mo. •
CONTRACT.-See Frauds, Statute of:
Offer to Sell Land-Acceptance.-A paper signed by A, by
which he agrees that B, in consideration of $1 paid, shall have for
thirty days the refusal of certain land therein designated, and that
he will convey the same in consideration of $20 per acre, $500 to
be paid on the execution of the deed, and the balance in a mortgage
on the land, with interest at six per cent., no timebeingnamed for
delivering the deed, nor any tim-e for which the mortgage shall run
is not a contract, but only a refusal or offer of the lands to B at a
certain price, and cannot be converted into a contract, unless ac-
cepted within the thirty days: Potts v. Whitehead, 5 C. E. Green.
An acceptance of an offer in writing to convey land within &
certain time, in consideration of a price named. may be communi-
cated by mail; but it must be actually placed in the post-office,
directed to the proper place; if directed to a place where the party
to be bound by it only sometimes resorts, it must be proved to
have been received: Id.
An offer in writing within a certain time to convey land, must
be accepted within the time fixed: Id.
A contract, any material part of which remains to be settled by
negotiation between the parties, will not be enforced in equity on
a bill of specific performance : Id.
Where there was a written offer to convey land within a time
fixed at a price named, of which a portion named was to be be paid
on the execution of the deed, and the balance in a mortgage on the
land, with interest at six per cent: Held, that the want of desig-
nation of any time when the great bulk of the consideration (that
to be secured by mortgage) was to be paid, left a material part of
contract to be settled by negotiation; and hence, even if such oiler
had been accepted, a decree for specific performance would not be
rade: Id.
CORPORATION.
Validity of Corporate Elections-Remedyis at Law.-The coo rt
of chancery has no jurisdiction to determine the validity of an elee-
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of the directors of a private corporation, and whether certain per-
sons claiming to be and acting as directors are such. It can,
therefore, grant no relief that is merely incident to that power:
Owen v. Whitaker, 5 C. E. Greene.
The only adequate remedy is in the courts of law, which have
power to adjudge the office vacant, and to compel the admission of
a person properly elected. The statute (Nix. Dig., 171, § 19)
fully confers this power: Id.
Powers of Receiver.-When a receiver of the property and effects
of a corporation if appointed and is qualified, he becomes, by the
express terms of the statute, a trustee not only for the creditor upon
whose application he was appointed, but for all the other creditors
ol the corporation: Libby v. Rosekrans et al., 55 Barb.
Directions to Beceiver.-And where, upon the application of such
receiver, directions are given by the court as to the manner of
making a sale of the property of the corporation in his hands, such
directions cannot be assailed, in a collateral action, on the ground
that they were, in effect, procured by a judgment creditor of the
corporation who then was, and still is, a justice of the court giving
the directions: Id.
It does not follow from that circumstance that the credit or was
not authorized to apply for an order of sale, and directions as to the
manner of conducting it; or that he could not draw the petition on
which it was made, and the order itself, either before or after it
was direc ted to be entered: Id.
Sale by Receiver-Setting aside.-It is no ground for setting aside
a sale of the property of a corporation made by a receiver, that the
creditor upon whose application the order of sale was obtained,
being a justice of the court, was, by means of his official position,
able to exercise any improper influence in the proceedings over the
court; where it is not shown that his official position resulted in
producing any different order or direction than the settled practice
authorized the court to give, or than would have been given, where
any other person was interested in the proceedings to be taken: Id.
Agreement against Public Policy.-An agreement by which a can-
didate for office receives from another person money to aid him in
securing his election, and in consideration thereof agrees to share
with such other person a portion of the proceeds and emoluments
of the office when elected, is immoral, against public policy, and
malum, in se, and is totally void: Ifartin v. Wade, 37 Cal.
Whether a contract against public policy be executory or execut-
ed, no action can be brought, either on the contract or to recover
back the consideration, or to recover judgment on a promissory
note made in consideration of a chancellation of such contract: Id.
There can be no recission of a contract against public policy. Such
contract is void at its inception, and there is nothing to rescind: Id.
DEBTOR AND CRBEDITOR.-See Husband and Wife.
Judgment against an Executor.-A creditor who has recovered a
judgment against the executor of a surety of his debtor, may en-
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force his claim by execution against the property of such executor,
notwithstanding the pendency of an injunction enjoining the cred-
itors generally of the principal debtor from proceeding against him
at law.-Beall, Executor v. Osboilrn, 30 Md.
An absolute judgment against an executor is conclusive of the
existence of the debt and of the sufficiency of assets to pay it; and
a fieri facias may be issued thereon and levied upon the lands of
the executor, as well as upon his goods and chattels: Id.
Sale void for fraud as against Creditors.-Although a bill of
sale of chattels to one who agrees to advance capital and the chat-
tels, and carry on business with the capital and chattels, and employ
the grantors at fixed wages, may have been intended by the latter
to defraud their creditors, yet if their object was unknown to the
grantee, their fraudulent intent will not affect him. Nor is it suffi-
cient to make such transfer void, that it does actually hinder and
delay creditors if such was not the- object and intent of it: Atwood
v. Impson, 5 C. E. Green.
Knowledge by the purchaser that the seller is embarrassed and
largely in debt, and that if no one would buy his goods, his cred-
itors would get their debts out of them will not affect the validity
of the sale, provided the object in purchasing was not to delay or
hinder creditors, but only to make a good bargain, or to procure
something of which the purchaser was in want: Id.
A sale, in making which the object of the debtor is to binder,
delay or in any way put off his creditors, is void if made to any
oue having knowledge of such intent, and this knowledge need not
be by actual positive information or notice, but will he inferred
from the knowledge by the purchaser, of facts and circumstances
safficientt raise such susp;cions as should put him on inquiry: Id.
Payment.-Money deposited by a debtor voluntarily with a third
person or in a bank, for the benefit of his creditor, without autho-
rity of the creditor, is not payment of a debt. The creditor is not
bound to send or draw for it unless he accepts it as payment
Freeholders of 1ild1lesex v. Thomas, 5 C. E. Green.
A mortgagor borrowed money and gave a second mortgage,
agreeing with the lender to use part of the money to pay off a rbri
mortgage, which was held by the board of chosen freeholder. His
attorney notified the county collector, who had the custody of tho
first mortgage, that he had deposited the money in bank, and the
collector receipted the bond and canceleC' the mortgage of record.
In ten days afterward'the bank stopped payment, and the money
not having been drawn the officer canceled the receipt, and ap-
pended a memorandum to the record that the cancellation was
entered by mistake: Reld, that the transaction was not a pay-
ment. The first mortgage remained a valid security, and might
be enforced in a suit for foreclosure: Id. /
A check or promissory note, either of the debtor or a third person,
received for a debt, is not payment ifnotitselfpaid, except in cases
where it is positively agreed to be received as payment: Id.
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Accepting a check or draft implies an undertaking of due dili-
gence in presenting.it for payment, and if the drawer sustains loss
for want of such diligence, it will be held to operate as payment: Id.
A written receipt is not conclusive, but proof is admissible that
the payment for which it was given was not actually received: Id.
EXECUTION.
Act March 23, 1863-Fresh Levies after Return Day-Efect
of.-Where an execution was levied, prior to the return day there-
of, on certain property, it would not continue in force, under the
Act of March 23, 1863 (Sess. Acts 1863, p. 20, § 2), for the pur-
pose of a fresh and independent levy on other property after the
return day of the execution. Under that act the execution would
afterward be dead for all purposes, except the preservation of
rights which attached prior to the return day by virtue of the ante-
cedent levy: Donald v. Gronefield, 45 Mo.
FIXTURE.
Removal of-Agreement Concerning.-Where a building is
erected by one person on the land of another by his permission, upon
an agreement or understanding that it may be removed at the pleas-
ure of the builder, it does not become a part of the real estate, but
continues to be a personal chattel and the property of the person
who erected it: Goodman v. Hann. andSt. Jos. . -R. Co., 45 Mo.
Where the landlord, before the expiration of the term, enjoins
the tenant from removing the chattels or fixtures, the tenant will
be allowed a reasonable time after the dissolution of the injunction
within which to demand and remove the same: Id.
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER.
Construction of Words "disseizin" and" Lawfully Possessed"
-Possession of Part of Premises-Landlory and Tenant.-A
claimed title to certain lands by virtue of the possession of B, his
grantor, but pever had possession himself: Held, That section 36,
chap. 187, (en. Stat. 1865, concerning suits for forcibie entry and
detainer, by heirs, devisees, grantees, etc., of persons dispossessed
under the statute, was not intended to apply to such cases. The
heirs, etc., have no greater rights than the ancestor, if living, or the
vendor, if he had not sold, could have had. The defendant must
still be found guilty of actual dispossession. The object of the
statute was not to change the rights or liabilities of the parties
hut when they had accrued, to provide that they should not lapsi-
by death or sale: Mc C'drtney's Adm. v. Alderson, 45 Mo.
T Phe statute concerning forcible entry and detainer (Gen. Stat.
1865, ch. 187) is a possessory action merely. The term "dis-
seizin," as therein used, implies actual dispossession. The term
"lawfully possessed" does not involve an inquiry into the law-
fulness of the possession as regards title, but only in regard to the
mode of obtaining it, and is equivalent to "peaceably possessed."
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In actions under this statute, proof of title in plaintiff, with Day-
ment of taxes and acts of ownership merely, is not evidence of
peaceable possession-.: Id.
The possession of a portion of the premises in dispute carries
the possession of the whole, if the title covers the whole: Id.
The landlord has no such possession as will enable him to com-
plain of a disseizin of his tenant: Id.
Deed as Evidence of Possession.-Where in a forcible entry ac-
tion the plaintiff, after introducing evidence tending to show an
actual possession of the demanded premises by one C up to the
time of the alleged forcible entry, introduced in evidence against
the defendant's objection thereto, a deed to the premises from C
to plaintiff, dated one month prior to said entry the apparent pos-
session of the premises by C was the possession of plaintiff: Held,
First, that there was no error in admitting the deed; and second,
that the fact sought to be established by the deed might properly
have been proven by parol evidence: Morgan v. Higgins, 37 Cal.
In forcible entry actions, evidence concerning the possession of
the locus in quo must be relevant-must, to be relevant, be such
as to connect the party asserting the same with the actual posses-
sion at the time of the alleged forcible entry: Id.
Entry by night-Demand Qf Possession.-The third section of
the Forcible -Entry and Detainer Act of April 2d, 1866, which
makes persons entering lands or tenements in the night time, or
during the absence of the owner, and refusing to surrender posses-
sion on demand, guilty of forcible detainer, is not unconstitutional:
Mecham v. McKay, i7 Cal.
The demand and refusal of possession required by the third sec-
tion of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act must be made after
the entry of the defendant.: Id.
The refusal, by the defendant in unlawful detainer to permit the
plaintiff to cut through the brick walls of the room, the possession
of which is in controversy, is not evidence of a refusal to deliver
up possession of the room, if that refusal was given for the pur-
pose of preventing an injury to the walls: Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Contract to find Purchaser of Land.-A contract by which P
agrees that if H will, within a fixed time, find a purchaser of P's
land at two hundred dollars per acre, P will sell and convey the
land to the purchaser, and that H may have for his services all
that can be obtained from the purchaser over two hundred dollars
per acre, is not a contract for the sale of any land or interest in
land, within the meaning of the eighth section of the statute of
frauds: Heyn v. Philips, 37 Cal.
Such contract is one of employment merely, and if H finds a
purchaser and P refuses to sell, H may recover from P for his
services what the purchaser was willing to pay over the price: Id.
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HFUSBAND AND WIFZ
Separate Estate of Wife-How Charged with her Debtb.-The
debts of a married woman holding an estate secured to her separate
use by the Act of 1852, when contracted by for the benefit of
her separate estate, or for her own use on the credit of that estate,
will be charged by a court of equity, upon the separate estate, "nd
payment enforced out of it: Armstrong v. Boss, 5 C. E. Green.
But such debts are not a lien upon her separate estate until made
a lien by a decree of a court of equity, and the lien arises by
virtue of the decree: Id.
A married woman cannot charge her separate estate, held under
the Act of 1852, by an appointment in writing, as she could for-
merly charge estates held by trustees for her, subject to her appoint-
ment; but can only convey or charge it by deed executed with her
husband, and duly acknowledged upon a separate examination,
except in cases where her husband is insane, or in State prison, or
living separate from her by judicial decree: Id.
The deed or mortgage of a married woman for lands in this State,
though duly acknowledged, if made without herhusband is void: Id.
Independent of the statutory provisions, an estate can be devised
or given to a married woman for her separate use, directly, without
the intervention of trustees; and in that case, the husband will, in
equity, be considered a trustee for the wife as to any estate which
might, by law, vest in him. But in such case the wife could not
convey lands so devised to her separate use without her husband
joining in the deed, or without the acknowledgment required by a
married woman: Id.
Wife's Earnings as against Creditors.-Although a husband may
give to the wife her services and earnings as against his creditors,
when she carries on aseparate business, without his assistance, with
her own means and on her own account, yet in all cases where a
business is carried on by a husband and wife in co-operation, and
the labor and skill of the husband are contributed and united with
those of the wife, the business will be considered as that of the hus-
band and not that of the wife, and the proceeds will not be pro-
tected for her as against his creditors: National Bank of the
Metropolis v. Sprague, 5 C. E. Green.
The fruits of the wife's labor and skill, under such circumstances,
are not her separate property within the terms or intention of the
act for the better securing the property of married women: Id.
Even if that act gave a wife the capacity to accept a gift of pro-
perty from her husband, she could not be allowed to retain such gift
as against his creditors, when made under circumstances which
would prevent it from being sustained in favor of a stranger: Id.
A conveyance taken in the name of the wife, of property pur-
chased with means of her -husband when in embarrassed circum.
stances, in order to screen it from his creditors, will be set aside ag
against future creditors: Id.
A married woman, who had no separate property, and had never
carried on any separate business, made a power of attorney to her
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husband to carry on, in her name, a hotel. The husband was, at the
time. extensively engaged in similar enterprises, and had become
embarrassed. The husband negotiated and executed, in the name
of his wife, acting as her attorney, articles of copartnership with
S, for conducting the hotel intended. Land and buildings for such
hotel were subsequently purchased, and the deed for them was taken
in the individual names of the wife and of S, her partner. A part of
the first installment of the purchase-money was paid from money
alleged to have been borrowed by the wife for the purpose and part
by the husband from his own means. The complainants advanced
money to the husband to be used in fitting up the hotel, upon the
faith of his representations to them that he was the purchaser of a
half interest in it. They now file a bill praying that the wife may
be decreed to hold the title to said property as trustee for her
husband, and convert it so as to be held subject to their remedy
at law: Held, that the circumstances proved an intent on the
part of the husband and wife to take the title in her name for the
purpose of delaying and defrauding his creditors, and that her
complainants were therefore entitled to the relief prayed: Id
JUDGMENT.
Modes of Correcting Errors in.-The law provides but two modes
of correcting errors in legal proceedings : one by motion, where the
error is one of form, arising out of a failure to conform to the set-
tled rules of practice of the court; the other by appeal, where the
errors consist in the omission of the court itself to properly observe
and apply the law affecting the rights involved in controversy, in
making the adjudication upon them: Libby v. Roselrans et al.,
55 Barb.
Where, in actions upon contracts for the sale and purchase of
land the judgments ascertained the amounts prospectively to become
due to the plaintiffs, respectively for principal and interest, at the
several times when the same were agreed to be paid by the defend-
ant, and then directed that in case the same should, at those periods,
remain udpaid, then the plaintiffs should have judgments for their
recovery and executions of their collections: Held, that there
was not only nothing improper in this disposition of the cases, but
that, on the contrary, the correct practice relating to them was
pursued: Id.
Held, also, that even if the directions contained in such judg-
ments were unwarranted by the law applicable to such cases, the error
could not be corrected by means of an independent action against
the plaintiffs in such judgments, brought by a stockholder in the
corporation which was the defendant therein: Id.
LiMAITATIONS.
Administrator's Bond- Construction of Statute.-An action on an
administrator's bond has ten years to run from the date of the ac-
cruingof the action. (R. C. 1855, ch. 103. Art. II. § 2.) Section 9. ch.
11,9 Gen. Stat. 1865, amending section3, Art. II., of the Practice
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Act of 1849, Sess. Acts 1849, p. 74), was intended to enlarge the
range of the ten years' limitation, as applied to personal actions, so
as to include actions upon written instruments, where the payments
contemplated by the obligation were to arise indirectly and colla-
terally as well as directly. Section 48, Art. 1, ch. 2, R. 0. 1855,
(Gen. Stat. 1865, ch. 120, § 49), limiting actions againstthe sure-
ties of administrators to seven years, is restrictive in its character
and was framed upon the evident hypothesis that the general limi-
tation act provided a longer time in which such suits could be
brought: Martin v. Knapp, 45 Mo.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Masters' Liability for Unskillfulness of Servant.-If a servant
does, without special orders, an act of such a nature that he is
Justified in doing it, as between him and his master, without an
express order, the master is liable for damages sustained by an in-
dividual in consequence of the act being done in an unskillful manner:
Gilmarlin v. The Mayor, &c., of the City of New York, 55 Barb
Thus, where the defendant's gardener, in attempting to take
down a liberty-pole, in a public park, which had become .danger-
ous, did it so unskilfully that it was precipitated against a tele-
graph pole, which was thereby broken off and cast against the
plaintiff's daughter, causing her death :--Held, that the defendants
were liable, although the gardener had received no express orders
to remove the pole from the officer having charge of the publie
parks: Id.
NEGLIGENCE.
Allegation of Negligence, Sufficiency of.-In a suit for damages
against a railroad company for killing a cow, the allegation that
the act was done carelessly and negligently was sufficient, and
showed a good cause of action: McPheters v. Hann and St Jos.
1. R. Co., 45 Mo.
Damages-Railroad Companies-Injuries-- Towns-Public
Crossings.-Where an injury, caused by a railroad train', occurred
at a public crossing in the streets of a town, no recovery could be
had without proof of actual negligence.
The doctrine that the owner of cattle is obliged to keep them on
his own premises, and that if they stray therefrom they are tres-
passers, and the owner is guilty of negligence, has never been the
law of this State: Id.
Semble, that in law there is no difference between negligence
and gross negligence, the latter being nothing more than the former,
with the addition of a vituperative epithet: Id.
PARTNERSHIP.
Partnership as to Third Persons-Province of the Jury.-
Where a party by his conduct held himself out as a partner of an-
Ather, in a transaction affecting a third person, who had reasonable
grounds to believe that he was such partner, and so trusted the
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firm, and had no knowledge to the contrary, they will be clearly
held partners as to such third person: Thomas v. Green, 30 Md.
Whether a person held himself out as a partner, is a fact to be
ascertained by the jury from all the evidence in the case: Id.
Remedy against Estate of Deceased Partner.-The rule that
the creditors of a copartnership will not be permitted to reach the
individual estate of a deceased partner until all the separate credi-
tors are satisfied, applies only to cases founded on the relation of
debtor and creditor, and cannot interfere with the remedy against
any individual, or his estate, as a wrong-doer: Morgan et al. v.
Skidore. Ex'r, 55 Barb.
Lien on individual Property of one Partner for Partnership
Debt-Preference.-The rule of courts of equity and bankruptcy,
when partnership assets are to be administered there, that they
must be applied to the partnership debts before any part can be
appropriated for the partners, or to pay their individual debts does
not operate to defeat a lien fairly and lawfully created by the part-
ners upon partnership assets in favor of individual creditors, be-
fore proceeding for a judicial administration where commenced:
Nat. Bank of lMetropolis v. Sprague, 5 C. E. Green.
Partners have the power, while the partnership assets remain
under their control, to appropriate any portion of them to pay or
secure their individual debts. A mortgage given by them to secure
individual debts fairly due, is not rendered void by the mere fact
that it operates to give individual debts a preference over demands
against the firm; nor will such mortgage be set aside for that rea-
son, by a court of equity, unless, perhaps, when created in con-
templation of insolvency, to give an improper preference : 1d.
If, in any case, one who has loaned money upon the credit of an
individual partner, could have established a demand thereof against
the firm, by proof that the money was borrowed and used for the
benefit of the firm, the right to do so is lost by proceeding, with
knowledge of the facts, to the recovery of judgment and the issu-
ing of execution against the individual partner: Id.
The only interest in property of the firm which can be reached
by virtue of a creditor's bill, founded upon such a judgment and
execution, is the share of the individual partner against whom the
judgment is rendered, in the assets, after payment of all partner-
ship debts: Id.
An execution on a judgment against partners for a partnership
debt, may be levied upon the individual property of either partner,
although the partnership property is sufficient to make the debt: Id.
PRACTICE.
Orders--How Corrected.-If an order, directing the receiver of a
corporation as to the manner in which he shall proceed in giving
notice of and conducting a sale of real estate, is irregular or impro-
vident, its correction should be sought by a motion before the
court that made it. An independent action will not lie for that
purpose, even though the plaintiff was not a party to the proceed-
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ang in which the order was made. Such an order cannot be ques-
tioned in a collateral action brought by a stockholder of a cor-
poration whose propertyis sold: Libby v. .Rosekranz et al., L5 Barb.
RAILROAD.
I)amages for rnjury-Forcible Ejection of Person from the car.-
In a suit brought by a boy sixteen years old for damages for injury
sustained by being forciby expelled from a railroad car, if the tes-
timony tends to show that the plaintiff is told he cannot ride, and
that he is ordered by the conductor, with a show of force, to get off
the car, a non-suit should not be granted upon the ground that the
carelessness and negligence of the plaintiff contributed to his injury:
Kline V C. P. B. B. ( o, 37 Cal.
If a boy, sixteen years of age, leaps from a railroad car while in
motion, in obedience to the command of the conductor, accompanied
by a show of force, the court cannot say judicially that the act of
the boy was voluntary, but should leave it to the jury to say whether
under all the circumstances, the conduct of the conductor did not
amount to compulsion: Id.
Although a person gets upon a railroad car wrongfully and as a
trespasser, for the purpose of riding without paying his fare, yetthe
conductor, if he resolves to exercise his right to remove him, must
do so prudently, and in such a manner as not to endanger his per-
sonal safety. If he do not exercise this prudence, and injury result,
the company cannot absolve itself from liability on the ground that
the wrong was mutual: Id.
If, in such a case, the conductor sees the person attempting to get
on the car, he may use force to prevent him, and no liability will
result from injury; but if the person is once fairly on the car, care
must be exercised in his removal: Id.
The rule that the plaintiff cannot recover damages if his own
wrong, as well as that of the defendant, cohduced to the injury, is
confined to cases where the plaintiffs wrong or negligence has
immediately or proximately contributed to the result: Id.
It is within the scope of the general authority of a railroad con-
ductor to remove persons from the cars who get on wrongfully; but
if, in so doing, he does not exercise care and caution, but acts mali-
ciously, and injury results, the company is liable: Id.
A railroad conductor is not acting outside of his authority in
admitting on its cars all persons properly seeking admission as pas-
sengers, or including all who do not come as passengers, or are
not fit to be admitted, and the company is liable for his wrongful
performance of either: Id.
STAMPS.
Waiver of Protest on a note.-The waiver, by an indorser of a
promissory note of presentation, demand notice of non-payment,
and protest, written upon the back of the note, need not be stamped
in order to be valid: Pacific Bankc v. De BRo, 37 Cal.
SHERIFF.
Bond, Liability on--Section 30, Chapter.63, B. C., 1855.-The"
obligor of a bond of indemnity given under section 30, ch. 63, B.
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(J., 1855 is liable thereon to the sheriff as well as to persons claim.
ing the property: Stewart v. Thomas, 45 Mo.
Execution-Indemnity Bond, suit on, by Sheriff-Notice to Plain-
tiff in Execution.-Where judgment is rendered against a sheriff on
his bond for an unlawful levy, and he afterward sues plaintiff in
the execution on his bond of indemnity (R1. C. 1855, ch. 63, § 30),
the latter may make any defense which could have been made in
the original suit against the sheriff. Notice with opportunity of
making the defense, should have been given the plaintiff in the
execution at the time of the first suit. Otherwise the judgment is
but prima facie evidence of his liability on the bond: Id.
TAX SALE.
Title of Parchaser- Caveat .Emptor.-A purchaser of a house and
lot in the city of Baltimore, sold by the city collector for non-pay-
ment of an assessment levied thereon, for opening. the street upon
which it was located, paid the purchase-money, received from the
collector a deed for the property, and entered into possession; sub-
sequently he was ejected by the owners, upon the ground that the
coliector had omitted to give the notice, as required by ordinance, of
such sales, and was obliged to pay costs and mesne profits. He
thereupon brought an action to recover damages from the city col-
lector: Held, that the purchaser was bound to inquire whether
the city collector, in selling the property, acted in conformity with
the law authorizing the sale; and coming strictly and rigidly within
the rule of" caveat emptor," he is not entitled to recover: .Hamil-
ton v. Valiant, 30 Md.
TAX TITLE.
What Title Con-veyed.-A tax collector's deed which purports to
convey to the purchaser" all the right, title and estate" of the State
of Missouri in and to the premises, and does not purport to convey
anything more, can pass no title to the purchaser: Einstein v. Guy,
45 Mo.
TENANT IN COMMI, ON.
Use and Occupation-1epairs.-One tenant in common, who
solely occupies the common property, cannot be held liable to his
co-tenants for use and occupation, unless there has been an actual
ouster of his co-tenants: Israel v. Israel, 30 Md.
A tenant in common, occupying the common property, will noL
be allowed for Pypenses which were incurred not for the preser-
vation of the ptoperty, but rather to gratify his taste and contribute
to his convenience: Id.
UNINCORPORATED SOCIETY.
Right to Sue.-The members of a voluntary incorporated associa-
tion are entitled, as individuals having a common interest, to sue in
regard to matters pertaining to or affecting their interests: Mears
and others v. Moulton, 30 Md.
